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Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories 
Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce  [1]
by Beatrice de Graaf
‘All counter-terrorism is a stage, and all counter-terrorists merely players’ 
(paraphrasing Shakespeare)
Abstract
Governments produce both deliberate and involuntary (and less conscious) narratives when 
countering terrorism.   The thesis of this article is that such unintended messages can be 
much more powerful and consequential than is realized; in fact, they can completely contra-
dict the intended offi cial ‘counter-narrative’. To  substantiate this hypothesis, the author looks 
at the experience of the German Federal Republic in the 1970s and beyond when state and 
society were confronted with the Red Army Faction (RAF) and similar left-wing “revolution-
aries” like those of the 2nd of June Movement or the Red Zora.
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s Social-Democratic Counter-narrative against 
Terrorism
The RAF was founded in 1970 by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and the already well-known publicist 
Ulrike Meinhof.[2] Until 1974, West Germany’s central government, headed by the Social- Democratic 
Party’ s leader, Chancellor Willy Brandt, was not very active in developing a counter-narrative.  This was, 
in part, due to the fact that the Federal Republic had been divided by the victors of the Second World War 
into strong regional states which governed their internal affairs rather autonomously and also dealt with 
terrorist incidents on their territory the way they saw fi t. It was also due to the fact that the left-liberal 
coalition, and especially Brandt, did not want to place domestic national security issues too high on their 
reformist agenda.[3] 
The fi rst to make an effort to instigate a form of national coordination on combating domestic terrorist 
violence was Horst Herold,  director of the Federal Criminal Offi ce (BKA) since 1971. He was the fi rst 
in Europe to introduce computers and data-mining techniques in the investigation process. He also recog-
nized the importance of conveying a message to the public at large, as many citizens felt intimidated by 
the militants of the RAF and affi liated organisations. Herold’s response to the bombing, shooting and kid-
napping campaign of the RAF was ‘to demonstrate state power’. This meant, inter alia, the use of road-
blocks, Most Wanted-posters and the massive and visible deployment of helicopters, police units and area 
searches. The wave of arrests in the Summer of 1972, when all the fi rst generation RAF members were 
traced and apprehended, gave Horst Herold’s approach credibility and gained widespread public support. 
It also earned him the nickname ‘Kommissar Computer’.[4]
Only after Willy Brandt’s successor in the German Chancellery, Helmut Schmidt, entered offi ce in 1974, 
and especially after CDU politician Peter Lorenz was kidnapped in 1975, the central government took 
counterterrorist matters more fi rmly in its own hands.[5] At this point, a genuine and original political 
counter-narrative was being developed.
Helmut Schmidt, as a Social Democrat, was not keen to evoke the old sentiment of the ‘War against 
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partisans and vandals’, as many offi cials within the BKA, the security apparatus and the conservative 
parties (CDU & CSU) were eager to do.  Rather than looking for support for his approach with the con-
servative hardliners, Schmidt stressed the value of the ‘Gemeinsamkeit der Demokraten’ (‘communality 
of democrats’). His main concern - and the message he wanted to spread -  referred to the protection of  
democracy and the rule of law. He therefore rigorously rejected all unconstitutional proposals that were 
made. While over 67 % of the population demanded the introduction of the death penalty, he refused to 
submit to such pressure. There were even more radical proposals, e.g. a police union proposing to issue 
rewards of 50.000 German Marks for anyone who killed a terrorist.[6] Others, such as the Bavarian presi-
dent of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, even called for reprisals against RAF prisoners and their relatives. 
‘Not with me’, was Helmut Schmidt’s response to such proposals. He thought such emergency measures 
would result in ‘morally cracking the people’.[7] 
Schmidt consciously invoked the concept of a ‘militant democracy’, as elaborated by Karl Loewenstein 
and Karl Mannheim, a concept that was in line with a ruling of the West-German Constitutional Court.[8] 
By using such a framework, the Chancellor was able to indicate that the German Federal Republic was 
not involved in a battle of the revolutionary Left against a (neo-) Fascist Right, as the RAF suggested, but 
instead suffered an attack on the liberal democratic order, prompted by a marginal group of terrorists. All 
parties were targets and therefore all were required to repel these attacks collectively.[9] 
This counter-narrative concept entailed the idea that the German Federal Republic was a constitutional 
democracy, that it had (and should have) the necessary power to combat any (perceived) threats to the 
democratic order[10] and that  citizens took their duties and obligations seriously, as Prime Minister of 
Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger, stated in the funeral speech for three police offi cers who had been 
killed during the abduction of Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of a powerful industrial  association.[11] 
In a statement issued on 15 September 1977, the government appealed to all young West-Germans, call-
ing upon them to respect democratic principles and asking them to ‘acquire and internalize a democratic 
sense of citizenship within our society’.[12]
Successes and Failures
This was a sensible and convincing message: it cut through the Left-Right divide,  inviting people of 
all parties to join forces in defence of the democracy. It gave the government the necessary authority to 
defend the political system. However, there were also some drawbacks. First of all, it closed the politi-
cal debate for all radical ideas and convictions. In other words, there was no political space left to vent 
and debate non-mainstream positions. This situation was made worse by the constitutional requirement 
that for a political party to enter parliament a minimum of   5% of all votes cast in an election had to be 
reached – a threshold that had been set after 1945 in the light of the Weimar experience. Secondly, it cre-
ated a situation where citizens where viewed as being  for or against democracy, with no  room for ma-
noeuvre, political abstinence, or any ideologically more differentiated position.  This ideological closure 
had very real social consequences: through the ‘Anti Radicals Decree’ of 1972, persons who were not 
deemed to be loyal to the state and the democratic system could be excluded from a career in the civil ser-
vice. Thousands of public employees were vetted, including school teachers, and many were disqualifi ed 
from civil service – rulings which frustrated many careers and are still in force today. 
Another weakness lay in the fact that the opposition did not accept the open invitation to join the ‘com-
munality of democrats’. Furthermore, it dismissed every nuanced tone in the political debate on radical-
ism as being ‘soft on terrorism’. In those German states where the right-of-center CDU-CSU parties were 
in control of the government, the conservative parties dismissed professors who showed some degree of  
‘understanding’ for the revolutionary radicalism of many young students. At the same time, members of 
the CDU-CSU kept attacking the ruling left-liberal coalition because of its allegedly soft stanced towards 
those who wanted to change society by violent actions. The Christian Democrats, notably CDU’s party 
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leader Helmut Kohl, deliberately evoked associations of chaos and democratic weakness and blamed the 
government for its ‘inability to govern’.[13] He painted the spectre of ‘political vandalism’ and a relapse 
into ‘the bad period of the Weimar Republic’. Berlin’s parliamentary CDU party chairman Heinrich Lum-
mer spoke of a ‘degeneration of democratic morals and principles’. Even the country’s  President, Karl 
Carstens (CDU), warned of a ‘weak state that, like in 1933, could not defend itself against its enemies’.
[14]
However, apart from this politicization of the debate on how to tackle terrorism, the most serious weak-
nesses of the ruling government’s counter-narrative pertained not to its contents, but to the way the secu-
rity forces, the regional authorities, the judiciary and the governing parties themselves were undermining 
their own narrative with actions that appeared to contradict completely their declaratory policy of adher-
ence to democratic values and the rule of law.
Signifi ers and Legends
In the context of counterterrorism politics the concept of ‘signifi er’ refers to a variety of occurrences, hap-
penstances, failures or situations where a certain meaning is attached to elements of government policy.
[15] The term ‘legends’ indicates the collective meaning that is linked to the ‘signifi er’ under consid-
eration (as in ‘urban legend’).  It can relate to stories narrated and distributed in response to signifi cant 
events, within the ‘radical scene’ itself, or within society at large. The signifi ers can be real events. How-
ever, the (urban) legends – the signifi cance attached to them – are often gross exaggerations or distor-
tions of what really happened. Terrorists, their supporters or sympathisers, as ‘entrepreneurs of violence’ 
are prone to intentionally overemphasize certain elements in order to construct ‘injustice frames’ out of 
signifi cant occurrences.[16]
What were the signifi ers and legends surrounding German counterterrorism efforts in those years? A 
very important signifi er was created from, and caused by, a police failure as early as 1967, when Benno 
Ohnesorg, a young student, was shot dead by a Berlin police offi cer named Karl Heinz Kurras during a 
demonstration against the visit of the Persian Shah and his wife.[17] Kurras was immediately cleared of 
all charges. At the time, the circumstances surrounding the shooting were never fully clarifi ed.  However, 
in May 2009, in an ironic twist of history, it surfaced that Kurras was, after all, not a ‘Fascist cop’, but 
a Stasi informer, working for the secret service of the German Democratic Republic.[18] The legend at-
tached to this police killing is encapsulated in an exclamation, attributed to Gudrun Ensslin: ‘The fascist 
state is back, they are out to kill us all, so we have to arm ourselves!’. One of the members of the 2nd 
JuneMovement - the organisation was founded  on the 2nd of June 1972 -  Ralf Reinders, explained why 
his group had opted for this name fi ve years after the death of Benno Ohnesorg: ‘Everyone knows what 
the 2nd of June means. By including this date in the name, people are forever reminded of the fact that 
they were the fi rst to shoot!’[19]
Another series of signifi ers were the new laws that were passed by parliament between 1974 and 1976.
[20] Criminal Procedures were made more strict, the RAF defence team was downsized, while at the 
same time the conditions for prosecuting and sentencing terrorists were upgraded. In 1976, a new para-
graph (Para.129a) was included in the German Penal Code, making ‘forming a terrorist organisation’ 
a punishable offence. As a result, not only the direct perpetrators, but also associates and accomplices 
providing logistical support could be prosecuted for terrorist crimes. In addition, the new law regarding 
‘Kontaktsperre’ (‘contact’- or ‘communications-ban’), passed on the 30 September 1977, allowed police 
and judicial authorities to isolate jailed RAF members completely from the outside world, even banning 
them from communicating with lawyers and close relatives. “Terror against the judiciary or terror by the 
judiciary?” the Hamburg news magazine Der Spiegel asked ominously.[21] The imprisoned RAF mem-
bers and their supporters made good use of these highly symbolic laws and engaged in hunger strikes to 
protest against their treatment, solitary confi nement,  alleged sensory deprivation and the whole system 
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of ‘political justice’ (a reproach associated with the Nazi period).[22] Through such efforts to portray the 
state as one that did not hesitate to engage in torture, a second generation of terrorists was created. New 
members were recruited through the solidarity committees which took up the cause of those imprisoned 
for ‘political’ reasons. Others came from among protest demonstrators supporting the imprisoned RAF 
leaders. They engaged in a new series of attacks, the culmination of which was the kidnapping of the in-
dustrialist H.-M. Schleyer and a supporting action by Palestinian militants, involving the hijacking of the 
Lufthansa plane Landshut in September-October 1977.[23]
The most damaging ‘signifi er’ however, was the climax of the ‘German autumn’, namely the collective 
suicide of imprisoned RAF terrorists of the fi rst generation in October 1977. The nationally and interna-
tionally predominant image of stern German governmental actions had already been constructed based on 
the TV footage of the high-security Stammheim prison, the previous suicide of Ulrike Meinhof and the 
many hunger strikes that RAF prisoners had carried out. Although the government of Helmut Schmidt 
had gained broad public support for the liberation of the hostages by the German elite team  GSG- 9 in 
Mogadishu, this did not alter the fact that in the eyes of a sizeable minority, the  survival of democracy in 
the German Federal Republic was considered to be in serious peril.[24]
These doubts gained more substance when four of the remaining fi rst generation RAF leaders were found 
dead (and in one case wounded) in their cells of the Stammheim prison, the day after the Landshut hos-
tages in the hijacked plane in Mogadishu (Somalia) were liberated. Although Brigitte Mohnhaupt, the 
new RAF leader, later admitted that she knew from the beginning that Baader and two of his colleagues 
had taken their own lives, at that time she immediately crafted the ‘legend’ that they had been murdered 
by ‘the government’. She and others portrayed this as another step in the direction towards a totalitarian 
police state. This legend managed to trigger a series of new terrorist actions in the years to come – attacks 
that continued with decreasing frequency and severity until the early 1990s.[25]
Only after the Stammheim drama did the government make serious efforts to try to  ‘neutralize’ the left-
wing legends with new counter-narratives of its own. As a consequence, political polarisation and mutual 
recrimination among the parliamentary parties declined. The accusation of being ‘weak’ was no longer 
made, and the government led by Chancellor H. Schmidt could at last relax somewhat. The social-liberal 
political coalition that had, up until then, acted relatively defensively, gradually came out of its shell. In 
1978, President Walter Scheel stated that there was to be an end to polarisation and the widespread ten-
dency to denunciate alleged terrorism sympathisers anonymously to the police. The ‘private sphere of fel-
low citizens’ was to be respected once again – by the police forces as well as the citizens themselves. [26]
In addition, in 1978, the new liberal Interior Minister, Gerhard Baum, published a series of TV interviews 
in book form - interviews he had conducted with Horst Mahler, a lawyer defending the RAF terrorists. 
In these dialogues he discussed the political aspirations of the left-wing ‘revolutionaries’ and exposed 
their failures in an open and honest debate.[27] Through this courageous step, it became clear to almost 
anybody except the most fanatic ‘true believers’ that the alleged relapse of West Germany into fascist 
behaviours had been a huge exaggeration. Freedom of speech prevailed throughout, and there was plenty 
of opportunity to criticise the new security measures. Furthermore, the government asked Horst Herold 
to step down as head of the BKA in 1981. Through his name, the BKA and counterterrorism had become 
tainted with the association of an Orwellian ‘surveillance state’, partly due to the data-mining programs 
Herold had introduced.[28]
The federal prosecution subsequently offered collaborating terrorists a crown witness arrangement - but 
this was kept secret for some time. In  1991 only, Minister Klaus Kinkel formalized this arrangement 
and - following the Italian experience with the pentiti [those who repented] – also offered lenient treat-
ment to sympathizers and supporters in exchange for a truce (contrary to Italy, the West-German authori-
ties excluded all terrorists from this provision who had been sentenced for major offences, only the ones 
with lower penalties could profi t from this offer).[29] This offer divided the remaining terrorists; some of 
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them did come forward and provided useful information, thereby allowing the authorities to roll up much 
of what remained of the RAF. However, the aftermath of German terrorism was protracted and only in 
1998 did the RAF offi cially disband itself. It is worth noting that this closure was not primarily the result 
of governmental counter-narratives or clemency offers. Neither was it the result of the pressure of pros-
ecution. It was just as much, and perhaps more, the result of the end of Communism in East Germany, 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. [30] What also mattered was that extremists who in the 1970s had 
endorsed the revolutionary ideals of the RAF found, since the 1980s, new outlets for their militant energy 
in non-violent civil society organisations and in the rising political party of the Greens.
Conclusion
What lessons can be learned from the German experience with left-wing terrorism between 1968 and 
1998? Four German lessons stand out:
1- The declaratory policy of offi cial narratives is less persuasive than the actual practical experience of 
terrorists and their sympathizers in their encounters with state and society – experiences gained from 
security measures, police approaches, and (ab-) uses of the law; 
2- Democratic governments need to recognize and understand the way terrorists and their sympathizers 
try to capitalise on the practices and, even more so, malpractices of the organs of the state when trying to 
maintain law and order;
3- Governments need to be cognizant of the fact that not only terrorists try to play politics with the gov-
ernment’s sometimes ill-considered counter-measures; 
4- Opposition parties also try to gain political capital from the confrontation between terrorists and the 
state and contribute to the polarisation in society while also being engaged in myth-making and the cre-
ation of urban legends. 
It is only possible to counter such legends, connected to all kinds of possible signifi ers, when these signi-
fi ers are fi rst clearly identifi ed. An effort of separating fact from fi ction probably produces more results 
than constructing counter- narratives that will have little effect at best or are considered state propaganda 
at worst - thereby further antagonizing radical elements in society.
 
Therefore, these ‘German lessons’ suggest that governments should not embark on inventing new, of-
fensive counter-narratives. It is doubtful that the government is the right party to launch a credible 
counter-narrative. The message of parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and association should 
be enough. However, it makes sense to invest energy and resources in neutralizing existing myths and 
legends. Those ‘neutralizers’ are much more important: they can serve to dry up the pool of new terrorist 
recruits, take away justifi cations for new attacks and, in doing so, undermine the potential legitimacy of 
terrorist calls to arms.
Terrorism is theatre, Brian M. Jenkins observed in the 1970s. That is also true for counter-terrorism. The 
public forum is the stage, and governments, political parties, civil society, media, and citizens are all 
players, performing one role or another. We would all do well to keep in mind that what matters is not 
only what we think we do, but how our performance is received and perceived by various audiences. The 
terrorist is a performer. Yet counter-terrorism too is about performance: it involves not only target harden-
ing, surveillance and prevention and pursuit. It also involves the production of images and stories and the 
debunking of legends, like the myth that the ‘West’ is seeking the submission of cultural, religious or eth-
nic minorities. [31] Before governments state their own counter-narrative against such myths, as is often 
advocated by counter-terrorist  experts,[32] the authorities should become fully aware of the unintentional 
and unconscious messages they propagate – messages that are often exaggerated by  terrorists and their 
sympathizers. Only when democratic governments succeed in shattering the myths and half-truth propa-
gated by terrorists and their sympathizers, will they manage to take the wind out of the sails that keep 
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terrorism alive. [33]
Dr. Beatrice de Graaf is Associate Professor at Leiden University and works at its Centre for Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism (CTC) in The Hague.
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